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ABSTRACT Introduction of non-pharmaceutical interventions to control COVID-19
in early 2020 coincided with a global decrease in active influenza circulation.
However, between July and November 2020, an influenza A(H3N2) epidemic
occurred in Cambodia and in other neighboring countries in the Greater Mekong
Subregion in Southeast Asia. We characterized the genetic and antigenic evolution
of A(H3N2) in Cambodia and found that the 2020 epidemic comprised genetically
and antigenically similar viruses of Clade3C2a1b/131K/94N, but they were distinct
from the WHO recommended influenza A(H3N2) vaccine virus components for
2020–2021 Northern Hemisphere season. Phylogenetic analysis revealed multiple
virus migration events between Cambodia and bordering countries, with Laos PDR
and Vietnam also reporting similar A(H3N2) epidemics immediately following the
Cambodia outbreak: however, there was limited circulation of these viruses else-
where globally. In February 2021, a virus from the Cambodian outbreak was recom-
mended by WHO as the prototype virus for inclusion in the 2021–2022 Northern
Hemisphere influenza vaccine.
IMPORTANCE The 2019 coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has significantly
altered the circulation patterns of respiratory diseases worldwide and disrupted
continued surveillance in many countries. Introduction of control measures in early
2020 against Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) infec-
tion has resulted in a remarkable reduction in the circulation of many respiratory
diseases. Influenza activity has remained at historically low levels globally since
March 2020, even when increased influenza testing was performed in some coun-
tries. Maintenance of the influenza surveillance system in Cambodia in 2020
allowed for the detection and response to an influenza A(H3N2) outbreak in late
2020, resulting in the inclusion of this virus in the 2021–2022 Northern Hemisphere
influenza vaccine.
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GENETIC DIVERSITY AND EVOLUTION
23 November 2021
Seasonal influenza viruses cause significant human morbidity and mortality world-wide (1). Epidemics occur annually in temperate regions and seasonality can vary in
tropical/subtropical regions with year-round circulation in some areas and epidemic in-
tensity varying by year and by region (2, 3). The disease burden of influenza can be
ameliorated by prophylactic vaccination (4), and mitigated with antiviral drugs and
social interventions such as school closures (5, 6). However, continued global surveil-
lance is necessary to ensure the availability of vaccine strains that best match the circu-
lating seasonal influenza viruses as well as potential pandemic influenza viruses (5, 7).
Emerging evidence suggests that the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has significantly altered
the circulation patterns of respiratory diseases worldwide and disrupted their contin-
ued surveillance in many countries. Indeed, introduction of control measures in early
2020 against Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection
has resulted in a remarkable reduction in the circulation of many respiratory diseases
(8–10). Influenza activity, for example, has remained at historically low levels globally
since March 2020, even when increased influenza testing was performed in some
countries (11, 12). Interestingly, the majority of influenza detections in 2020 and in the
first part of 2021 have been in Southeast Asia and other tropical regions such as
Western Africa (13–15).
The Kingdom of Cambodia (population: 16.5 million) is a tropical country in the
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) of Southeast Asia, sharing international borders with
Thailand, Laos PDR, and Vietnam. Influenza detection in Cambodia normally increases
during March–June, and peaks between June and November during rainy season, con-
sistent with influenza circulation patterns in the temperate regions of the Southern
Hemisphere, although low level year-round circulation of influenza is detected in
Cambodia (16). Due to a robust and swift response, SARS–CoV-2 was well managed
and controlled in Cambodia and other parts of the GMS, and Cambodia detected no
widespread community transmission throughout 2020. However, in July 2020, influ-
enza detections began to increase in the Cambodian influenza-like illness (ILI) sentinel
surveillance systems reflecting a country-wide outbreak that included clustered cases
in closed/semi-closed settings (prisons/pagodas) and spreading into the general com-
munity (13). Influenza cases were subsequently detected in Vietnam, Laos PDR, and
Thailand (14, 15) by their WHO National Influenza Centers (NICs). Here we describe
virological findings from sentinel ILI surveillance in Cambodia and the region. In addi-
tion, genetic and antigenic characteristics of influenza viruses detected during the re-
gional outbreaks were assessed to determine the degree of vaccine match with the
currently recommended A(H3N2) influenza vaccine and the likelihood of a more global
spread in the future.
RESULTS
Laboratory detection of influenza in Cambodia, 2020, in relation to stringency.
While influenza virus detection typically increases in Cambodia from April to June (16),
no laboratory confirmed cases of influenza were detected in Cambodia between April
(week 14) until mid-June (week 24, Fig. 1) 2020. This reduction coincided with the
implementation of several COVID-19 public health prevention measures and interven-
tion policies (19) (Fig. 1). However, a significant rise in laboratory confirmed influenza
A(H3N2) cases occurred from the end of July 2020 (week 31) until mid-November
(week 46). Peak positivity occurred at week 34, with 36% (12/33) of the ILI and SARI
samples testing positive for influenza A(H3N2). In total, there were 368 laboratory-con-
firmed cases of influenza A(H3N2) from 11 outbreaks in 10 provinces between July and
November 2020 in Cambodia. Overall positivity rate for laboratory confirmed influenza
A(H3N2) in Cambodian ILI samples was 77% (368/475).
Phylogenetic analysis of recent Cambodian influenza A(H3N2) viruses. Phylogenetic
analysis of the HA genes showed that A(H3N2) viruses collected in Cambodia during
2019 until March 2020 were derived from both major A(H3N2) clades circulating prior
to COVID-19 emergence, including subclades 3C2.A1b 1 135K and 3C2.A1b 1 131K,
with the majority forming a cluster belonging to 3C2.A1b 1 135K (reference strain:
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A/Cambodia/e0403374/2020) (15, 23). In contrast, all Cambodian A(H3N2) viruses col-
lected during the outbreaks from July 2020 to November 2020 (such as A/Cambodia/
e0826360/2020) belonged to 3C2.A1b 1 131K clade and were highly similar to each
other (Fig. 2). They formed a distinct cluster with viruses collected in neighboring Laos
PDR, Vietnam, and Thailand (Fig. 3). This predominantly Southeast Asian A(H3N2) clus-
ter formed a sister group containing samples from South Asia, collected from
Bangladesh and India from August 2020, and appear to be circulating in southeast Asia
and the Australia during early 2020 (reference: A/Tasmania/503/2020) (15, 23).
Maximum likelihood phylogenetic analysis showed that viruses similar to those
detected in Cambodia were also detected in a similar time period in all three bordering
countries including Laos PDR, Vietnam, and Thailand, and that cross-border transmis-
sion may have occurred on multiple occasions. Samples collected from Vietnam and
Thailand formed five and three distinct clusters, respectively, that were derived from
viruses collected in Cambodia, indicating transmission has occurred on multiple events
along these borders; however, the direction of migration between Cambodia and Laos
PDR could not be confirmed as their HA genes were highly identical (Fig. 3). Detection
of viruses in Vietnam and Laos PDR occurred rapidly after detection in Cambodia from
August to November with additional analysis of the WHO Flunet system (Fig. 1).
FIG 1 Influenza detection by week in Cambodia, Laos PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam in 2020 compared to
pandemic response stringency. Influenza detection in Cambodia (A), Laos PDR (B), Thailand (C), and Vietnam
(D) compared to average weekly stringency (19) of public health policies enacted in accordance with the
COVID-19 pandemic (blue line).
Influenza A(H3N2) in Cambodia during COVID-19 Journal of Virology
December 2021 Volume 95 Issue 24 e01267-21 jvi.asm.org 3
Furthermore, while no additional sequences were reported from Southeast Asia since
December 2020, cases reported from Laos PDR during February to March in 2021 were
similar to the Cambodian outbreak based on their HA sequences (Fig. 3), showing that
some lineages emerging within the Cambodian outbreak continued to circulate in
Laos PDR until early 2021.
In comparison to previously circulating viruses, both the South and Southeast Asian
A(H3N2) lineages (3C2.A1b 1 131K) contained signature HA amino acid substitutions
at K83E, Y94N, F193S, and Y195F, while the Southeast Asian lineage contained addi-
tional substitutions at G186S, S198P, and K171N (Fig. 2 and 4). In recognition of these
independent outbreaks in South and Southeast Asia with additional HA substitutions,
the A/(H3N2) influenza vaccine prototype was updated in February 2021 to include a
Cambodian outbreak virus strain (A/Cambodia/e0826360/2020) representative of
recent 3C2.A1b 1 131K viruses (15).
Antigenic analysis of 2020 Cambodian influenza A(H3N2) viruses. Influenza
A(H3N2) isolates were successfully generated from Cambodian clinical samples using
MDCK-SIAT-1 cells, and all virus isolates obtained agglutinated guinea pig RBC well,
with samples collected early in 2020 generating isolates with hemagglutination titers
of generally 16–64 and late collection 2020 isolates generally having titers of 8–32
(measured in the absence of oseltamivir carboxylate). Antigenic analysis by HI was per-
formed on these early and late 2020 Cambodian A(H3N2) virus isolates against a panel
of reference viruses and ferret postinfection antisera and a pool of postvaccination
human sera. Table 1 shows the results with the recent Cambodian viruses giving simi-
lar reactivity to A/Tasmania/503/2020-like viruses and viruses collected from Timor-
L’este in July–August 2020, (which also grouped in the same genetic HA clade; see
FIG 2 Dated phylogeny of HA gene of A(H3N2) virus showing an apparent global bottleneck in 2020. The analysis was based on
1,387 globally representative samples using the best-fit nucleotide substitution model (GTR1F31R4). Cambodia viruses are colored in
red, and reference strains and recent vaccine strains are highlighted along the tips.
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FIG 3 Evolutionary relationships of the A(H3N2) viruses in Southeast Asia, late 2020–2021. Maximum likelihood phylogeny with branch
lengths in substitutions per site (scale bar) generated using the best-fit nucleotide substitution model (K3Pu1F). Viruses collected from
Southeast Asia from Jun 2020 are colored by country.
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Fig. 3) and were distinct from earlier 2020 Cambodian viruses (such as A/Cambodia/
e0403374/2020 collected on 8 March 2020; Fig. 2). Reduced reactivity was seen to
these Cambodian viruses with other ferret antisera generated to an A/Hong Kong/
2671/2019-like virus (A/Darwin/726/2019), A/South Australia/34/2019 (the 2020
Southern hemisphere recommended A(H3N2) vaccine virus), and the previous
Northern hemisphere 2019–2020 recommended vaccine virus A/Kansas/14/2017,
which showed 2–8-fold reductions with ferret antisera raised to this virus (data not
shown). Reduced reactivity was also seen with the 2020 postvaccination Australian
human serum pool. Together this indicates that the late 2020 Cambodian viruses were
antigenically distinct from the previous two A(H3N2) vaccine viruses and therefore
may escape prior immunity generated by infection or vaccination with these previous
A(H3N2) viruses.
Visualization of antigenic mismatches on the H3 structure. Neutralizing antibod-
ies predominantly recognize antigenic sites on the globular head of the HA (epitopes
A–E, Fig. 4A) (33), and most major antigenic changes of H3N2 viruses between 1968
and 2013 are accredited to mutations in antigenic site B (34, 35). However, mutations
in other sites can also contribute to antigenic escape/evolution of the virus. To comple-
ment the antigenic distance measures by the HI assay, we visualized the antigenic mis-
matches in dominant epitopes between the vaccine strains and Cambodian 2020
viruses on the crystal structure of the A/Brisbane/10/2007 A(H3N2) (Fig. 4). With the
2020/2021 Northern and Southern hemisphere egg-based vaccine strain A/Hong
Kong/45/2019 (H3N2), a total of 11 mismatches were observed. A total of 4, 3, 1, 1, and
2 mismatches were observed in antigenic sites A, B, C, D, and E, respectively (Fig. 4B;
Table 2). With the 2020/2021 Northern and Southern hemisphere cell-based vaccine
FIG 4 Location of antigenic mismatches between the 2020/2021 H3N2 vaccine virus and recent Cambodian
viruses. (A) Influenza HA subunits and antigen sites A–E mapped on the crystal structure of the A/Brisbane/10/
2007 (H3N2) influenza virus HA in complex with NeuAca2-6Gal (PDB: 6AOV). (B) Antigenic mismatches between
the 2020/2021 H3N2 vaccine seed strains and recent Cambodian viruses. The 2020/2021 vaccine seed strains
included both the egg-based (A/Hong Kong/2671/2019) and cell-based (A/Hong Kong/45/2019) vaccine. Egg
-and cell-based specific antigenic mismatches are indicated by * and #, respectively.
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strain A/Hong Kong/2671/2019 (H3N2), a total of 11 mismatches were observed. A
total of 4, 4, 0, 1, and 2 mismatches were observed in antigenic sites A, B, C, D, and E,
respectively (Fig. 4B; Table 2). Collectively, this supports the antigenic data that vac-
cines based on A/Hong Kong/2671/2019-like viruses may have reduced efficacy against
currently circulating Cambodian H3N2 viruses and is consistent with the need to
update the annual vaccine to account for these changes.
DISCUSSION
Following the WHO declaration of COVID-19 as a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern (36), and COVID-19 as an international pandemic (37), numerous
non-pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) strategies were implemented globally to prevent,
detect and contain viral spread (38), including closing borders or suspending interna-
tional flights, entry quarantine for travelers, physical distancing, hand washing, mask
wearing, and mass testing. It is apparent that these swift and more stringent measures
taken to mitigate the spread of SARS-CoV-2 have also affected the global circulation of
influenza viruses (11), with implementation of these prevention measures directly coin-
ciding with a global reduction of influenza in most countries. However, while global
detection was low, influenza was present in a small number of countries during the nor-
mal winter periods in the Southern hemisphere, mainly in the tropical South/Southeast
Asia (14) and West Africa transmission zones (15). In Cambodia, a number of NPIs were
introduced by the Cambodian government to break COVID-19 transmission chains.
However, as stringency in policies decreased (19), some influenza was detected in senti-
nel systems in late June 2020. It is unknown whether the virus may have been circulating
at low levels for some time before detection or when the virus was introduced into the
country. Interestingly, outbreaks of A(H3N2) were also detected in other places sharing
borders with Cambodia, namely, Vietnam and Laos PDR, but only a few sporadic detec-
tions were seen in Thailand. This may indicate the virus was circulating in the region
through travel across land borders or other unknown transmission routes.
Cambodian A(H3N2) viruses from late 2020 were both genetically and antigenically
distinct from viruses circulating earlier in the year in Cambodia, and different from the
TABLE 1 Antigenic analysis of 2020 Cambodian influenza A(H3N2) viruses by hemagglutination inhibition assaya
aYellow highlight indicates sera raised against the 2019 vaccine recommended strain. The purple indicates sera raised against the 2021 vaccine candidate. Green indicates
sera raised against A/Darwin/726/2019, which is the cell-based equivalent of the 2021 WHO recommended Southern Hemisphere vaccine strain, A/Hong Kong/2671/2019.
Gray indicates the human sera pool of individuals vaccinated with a quadrivalent vaccine containing a A/South Australia/34/2019-like A(H3N2) virus.
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A(H3N2) viruses that circulated in many parts of the world in 2020. Therefore, low level
immunity against these viruses may pose an increased risk of them producing outbreaks
and epidemics in the Northern hemisphere in 2021–2022 and in the 2022 Southern
hemisphere seasons if they continue to circulate. Indeed, previous studies have shown
that A(H3N2) viruses are regularly re-seeded from East and Southeast Asia into other
parts of the world (39). Given the finding that these recent Cambodian viruses appear to
be antigenically distinct from the current A(H3N2) vaccine viruses, coupled with the lack
of influenza virus circulation in many other countries, the number of people at risk from
infection with A(H3N2) may increase when (inter)national travel and other social restric-
tions are eased. Due to the risk from this virus, Cambodian A(H3N2)-like viruses have
been recommended by the WHO as a vaccine prototype strain for the Northern
Hemisphere 2021/2022 influenza season (15).
Overall, these data highlight that despite the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic,
influenza virus outbreaks continue to occur, such as those seen in Cambodia, Vietnam,
and Laos PDR. While global influenza circulation is still currently low up to mid-2021,
including in Cambodia, outbreaks can and will occur, especially in closed, high-contact
settings such as prisons and at religious gatherings, where enforcement and mainte-
nance of NPIs are more challenging. It is unknown when and where influenza will
return in force following the COVID-19 pandemic, especially as international travel
reopens/resumes. Maintenance of global influenza surveillance is vital not only for the
continued detection of influenza, but also for other respiratory diseases including
COVID-19. Rapid investigation of outbreaks and differential diagnosis is critical to
determine the etiology of the outbreak not only to rule out SARS-CoV-2, but to ensure
the appropriate public health actions. Timely testing, sequencing, and sharing of respi-
ratory virus data (including from influenza viruses) are critically important for all coun-
tries, especially in the context of the lack of global influenza samples that have been
TABLE 2 Comparison of amino acid differences in major antigenic sites between Cambodian A(H3N2) strains and
recommended vaccine composition strains for 2020/2021.
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available since mid-2020 for vaccine development, challenging the continued need for
well-matched seasonal influenza vaccines.
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
Ethics. The Cambodian ILI and Severe Acute Respiratory Illness (SARI) surveillance systems are part
of the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System and are a public health activity man-
aged by the Ministry of Health (MoH) and Cambodian Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that
has a standing authorization from the National Ethics Committee for Human Research. Samples col-
lected under the Cambodian COVID-19 response are permitted to be further analyzed for pathogens of
public health concern in the context of influenza circulating throughout the country. Samples and
patient information were anonymized for the purposes of this surveillance.
Influenza detection and laboratory investigations. Influenza in Cambodia was tested using RT-
PCR in all sentinel surveillance samples from November 2019 to Dec 2020 that were suspected of respi-
ratory disease outbreak (COVID-19 and ILI), and those referred from symptomatic suspect COVID-19
cases (16, 17), according to recommendations for testing under the Global Influenza Surveillance and
Response System guidelines (18). Total influenza data reported from Cambodia, Laos PDR, Vietnam, and
Thailand from January to December, 2020 were downloaded from FluNET (https://www.who.int/tools/
flunet).
COVID-19: stringency index. Weekly calculated stringency indices of COVID-19 response for each
country were obtained from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (19).
Sequencing. Cambodian influenza A whole genomes were amplified using Uni12/Inf-1 and Uni13/
Inf-1 (20) with SSIII One-step RT-PCR with Platinum Taq High Fidelity kit (Thermo Fisher, Australia), and
14 ml of RNA from original specimens or 8 ml of RNA from cultured virus were used for the reaction, fol-
lowing manufacturer’s instructions. After amplification, amplicons were quantified on a TapeStation
4200 using D5000 ScreenTape (Agilent, Australia). Amplicons were normalized with nuclease free water
to contain 200 ng of target DNA in 30 ml volume and used for NGS library construction using Nextera
DNA Flex Library Prep kit and IDT for Illumina Nextera DNA Unique Dual Indexes Sets A-D (Illumina,
Australia), followed by library clean up and pooling according to the manufacturer’s instructions. The
pooled library was quantified on the TapeStation 4200 with Tapescreen HSD1000 and Qubit 1X dsDNA
HS assay kit on the Qubit 4 (Thermo Fisher, Australia). The pooled library was then diluted to 150pM in
elution buffer supplied in the library prep kit and was loaded into the iSeq100 i1 v2 (300-cycle) cartridge
containing the flow cell. The sequencing parameters for the iSeq100 system were set at pair end reads,
2  151 bp read length with adaptor trimming on. After the NGS run, fastq data were retrieved and ana-
lyzed using the IRMA pipeline (21) to generate consensus sequences for the whole genome sequences.
Phylogenetic analysis. The hemagglutinin (HA) sequences of Cambodian A(H3N2) viruses were ana-
lyzed with sequences from the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) (22). The GISAID
data were selected based on criteria used by Nextstrain (23), in which a greater frequency of recent sam-
ples were sampled along with key reference sequences. We included all available HA sequences available
since March 2020. Following multiple sequence alignment using Muscle v.3.8 (24), phylogenetic relation-
ships were inferred using the maximum-likelihood (ML) method in IQTREE v.2.0 (25) using the best-fit nu-
cleotide substitution model and dated using Least Squares Dating (LSD) method (26). Data quality was
investigated using a root-to-tip regression of the ML tree and collection dates in TempEst v.1.5 (27), and
branch supports were estimated using the ultrafast bootstrap method in IQTREE v.2.0 (28).
Hemagglutination inhibition assay. Antigenic properties were determined using the hemaggluti-
nation inhibition (HI) assay (29). Influenza virus isolates were generated by inoculation of influenza posi-
tive respiratory samples into MDCK-SIAT-1 cells (30) and stored at 280°C until assayed. Reference ferret
antisera were obtained from ferrets 14 days after they had been infected with a range of human
A(H3N2) influenza viruses. A pool of human sera obtained from post-vaccinated (4 weeks after vaccina-
tion) recipients of the 2020 Australian quadrivalent influenza (egg based) vaccine (that contained an A/
South Australia/34/2019-like A(H3N2) virus) was also included in the HI. All of these antisera were pre-
treated with receptor-destroying enzyme (Denka Seiken, Tokyo, Japan) to remove any nonspecific bind-
ing. HI assays were performed in the presence of 20 nM oseltamivir carboxylate (OC) (kindly provided by
Roche AG (Basel, Switzerland)) to reduce nonspecific binding of the NA protein (31). Two-fold serial dilu-
tions were made on the treated serum in phosphate-buffered saline in 96-well U-bottom microtiter
plates. All viruses were adjusted to 4 hemagglutination units per 25 ml, and this virus suspension was
added to each of the 96 wells before incubating for 30 min at room temperature. After this, 25 ml of
freshly prepared 1.0% (vol/vol) guinea pig red blood cells (RBCs) were added to each well and the plates
were incubated for a further 45 min at room temperature. Plates were read and HI titers were obtained
from the reciprocal of the highest serum dilution that contained non-agglutinated RBCs. All animal work
was approved by the University of Melbourne Animal Ethics Committee.
Structural modeling. The X-ray crystal structure of the influenza A virus hemagglutinin of A/Brisbane/
10/2007 (H3N2) in complex with NeuAca2-6Gal (PDB: 6AOV) (32) was used to map the locations of the
vaccine strain mismatches using PyMOL Molecular Graphics System, Version 2.3 Schrödinger, LLC.
Data availability. The newly determined sequences are available in GISAID (https://www.gisaid.org/)
under accession numbers EPI_ISL_1041017-20, 410161-62, 410164, 514677-78, 514680-83, 514689-90,
514701-4, 514708, 514712-3, 710454-482, 718125, and 944641-2.
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